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Abstract :  Anecdotal evidence, 
consisting mainly of soldiers’ 
testimony and widely accepted as 
fact, suggests that Canadian infantry 
reinforcements in the Second World 
War lacked training. However, a 
sample of service records does not 
support the contention that the 
army sent masses of untrained men 
to war. Indeed, the service files of 
soldiers killed in Italy with the 48th 
Highlanders of Canada between 
January and October 1944 indicate 
that the army rushed few men into 
battle. Furthermore, the war diaries 
of units that provided refresher 
training to men in the reinforcement 
stream indicate that the army strove 
to ensure soldiers were ready for 
combat.
Anecdotal evidence, such as the above quotation, suggests that 
the Canadian Army rushed poorly 
trained infantry reinforcements to 
battle during the Second World 
War. Widely accepted as fact, the 
common perception of inadequate 
reinforcement training can be 
traced back to September 1944, 
when Toronto sports entrepreneur 
Conn Smythe issued a statement 
to the press lambasting the poor 
quality of Canadian reinforcements. 
Smythe, who had been wounded the 
previous July while commanding 
an anti-aircraft battery in France, 
claimed to have conferred during 
his convalescence with other injured 
officers from across the army who 
agreed that reinforcements were 
appallingly ill-prepared for combat. 
He asserted that an unacceptable 
proportion of men had never thrown 
a grenade, were unfamiliar with 
the Bren gun, or had never fired, 
or sometimes even seen, a PIAT 
(Projector Infantry Anti-Tank) gun. 
His claim alarmed the public and 
Cabinet,2 and soon every major 
Canadian newspaper reproduced 
his story, fuelling the concern.3 
Smythe’s allegations echoed the 
apparently widespread sentiments 
of officers fighting in Italy. According 
to an army historical officer’s 
report of 20 February 1944, “All 
commanders in Italy agree that the 
mental and physical qualities of 
their reinforcements are high but 
complain that their basic training is 
frequently inadequate.”4 Later that 
year, when the minister of national 
defence, Colonel J. Layton Ralston, 
visited Canadian units in Italy, the 
regimental sergeant major (RSM) of 
the 48th Highlanders complained 
that only seven out of 72 men in a 
recent reinforcement draft were fully 
trained.5
D e s p i t e  s u c h  c o m p e l l i n g 
testimonies, it is not clear that the 
army rushed masses of poorly trained 
infantry reinforcements into combat. 
When, for example, Ralston pressed 
the RSM for the 72 names, his unit 
could provide only 34. Ralston 
ordered a review that eventually 
determined that all 34 men had been 
in the army for at least a year, a 
quarter had over three years under 
arms, and some were highly trained 
specialists.6 More recently, historians 
have questioned the accuracy and 
consistency of the anecdotal evidence 
suggesting that the degree to which 
undertrained soldiers was a problem 
remains a gap in the historical 
record.7 Robert Engen’s examination 
of battle experience questionnaires 
completed by infantry officers during 
the Second World War shows that 
59.9 percent of respondents felt that 
the general standard of reinforcement 
efficiency was “moderate” and 
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“Alex told me that the hundred and forty soldiers following us had arrived in England from Canada only 
a month earlier. Inadequately trained and unprepared for what awaited them, they had been prematurely 
shipped to Italy to transfuse our wasted regiment. Marching behind us in their clean, new uniforms, they 
joked with one another, stared curiously at the debris of war, and sang the brave and foolish songs they had 
learned in Canada.”1         Farley Mowat, And No Birds Sang. 
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another 5.6 percent thought it was 
“high,” compared to 26.8 percent 
who answered “low.”8 While these 
numbers were not quite a ringing 
endorsement of reinforcement 
quality,  they hardly reflected 
unanimous condemnation either. 
Given the lack of clarity on the matter 
of reinforcement training,  it is useful 
to examine archived army records 
to understand better how the army 
prepared infantry reinforcements 
for combat. Evidence drawn from 
a sample of personnel files from 
a regiment that fought in Italy, 
the 48th Highlanders of Canada, 
as well as the war diaries of the 
army’s reinforcement training units, 
suggests that Canadian infantry 
reinforcements were, for the most 
part, reasonably well-trained when 
they joined their battalions. While 
a relatively small proportion may 
have been inadequately trained, 
the body of anecdotal evidence 
exaggerates the extent of the problem.
The personnel files consulted were 
those for all members of the 48th 
Highlanders who died during the 
first ten months of 1944, a period 
when the army was hard-pressed 
to maintain unit strengths in Italy 
due to unexpectedly high infantry 
casualty rates. During this period, the 
48th Highlanders, a justifiably proud 
and hardened veteran unit of the 1st 
Canadian Infantry Brigade in the 1st 
Canadian Infantry Division, lost 143 
men.9 Their service files, available 
to the public without restriction,10 
provide a sample with which to 
assess how the army prepared its men 
for combat duty. These files are useful 
because they contain documents 
indicating the exact dates each soldier 
spent at every training, holding, 
reinforcement, and operational unit 
during his military service.11 
Of the 143 men who died, 89 were 
reinforcements who disembarked 
in theatre after  the Canadian 
army landed in mainland Italy on 
3 September 1943. Most of these 
reinforcements followed the same 
training and deployment pattern 
(see Figure 1).12 After basic recruit 
and infantry training in Canada the 
men were transported to Britain 
where they were usually posted to 
a Canadian Infantry Reinforcement 
Unit (CIRU).13 Once called up 
for service in the Mediterranean 
Theatre, soldiers then moved to the 
2
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1st Canadian Base Reinforcement 
Depot (CBRD) (which, by January 
1944, was located in Avellino, Italy) 
where they trained while awaiting 
call-up for service in a front line unit. 
Reinforcements for the 48th 
Highlanders during the first ten 
months of 1944 were, in the majority 
of cases, not as new to the army as 
one might expect. While it is true 
that some soldiers had less than 
a year in uniform on the day they 
reported to the unit, they were 
exceptions. For the 89 reinforcements 
reviewed, the average time a soldier 
had been in the army at the moment 
he joined the 48th Highlanders in the 
field was almost 26 months. If one 
examines only the privates, that is the 
group with the men most recently in 
uniform, the average time in service 
does not drop much. Sixty-seven of 
the 89 soldiers were privates, and as 
a group they averaged slightly over 
23 months in the army. Only 17 had 
less than a year in uniform when they 
were “taken on strength” by the 48th 
Highlanders. 
The amount of time spent at a 
CIRU in Britain and at the CBRD 
in Italy varied greatly from soldier 
to soldier. Some men spent only a 
few weeks in the UK, while others 
spent well over two years there. The 
average time each soldier spent in 
Britain was just over ten months, a 
considerable amount of time during 
which a man was available for 
training. Similarly, the time each 
individual spent at the CBRD in Italy 
varied greatly, with some soldiers 
having spent as little as one or two 
weeks, while others were there for 
many months. The average time 
spent at the CBRD was just over six-
and-one-half weeks, suggesting that 
the typical soldier had time to receive 
a reasonable amount of in-theatre 
refresher training immediately prior 
to joining the 48th Highlanders in the 
field. However, the individual service 
files contain little information about 
what training the soldiers received in 
the reinforcement units in Britain and 
Italy, making it necessary to consult 
the war diaries of those units.14 
Infantrymen arriving in Britain 
from basic training in Canada went 
to one of seven CIRUs.15 The war 
diary for 1 CIRU for January to 
October 1944 shows that new arrivals 
were posted to training companies, 
which in January 1944 conducted 
“basic refresher courses” of two, 
four and six weeks duration, and 
one “advanced training” course.16 In 
March 1944, all CIRUs implemented 
a mandatory two-week refresher 
course for all new arrivals. All 
soldiers who completed the course 
then had to pass weapons handling 
tests, known as Tests of Elementary 
Training (TOETs). Soldiers who 
failed the tests received further basic 
training, while the rest continued to 
receive advanced refresher training 
while awaiting call-up for service in 
Basic training at Landsdowne Park, 
Ottawa, Ontario.
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Europe.17 Refresher training included 
exercises on anti-tank ranges, zeroing 
rifles, firing Sten and Thompson sub-
machine guns, throwing grenades, a 
special one-week mines and booby 
traps course, battlefield first aid, 
preparation of defensive positions, 
individual field craft, and night 
patrols.18 By April 1944, 1 CIRU held 
company commanders personally 
responsible for providing all their 
troops, including their permanent 
establishment personnel who could 
be deployed to operational units, 
with as much training as possible. 
The company commanders were 
also responsible to retest all troops’ 
individual skills every three months.19
After completing the mandatory 
two-week refresher course, soldiers at 
1 CIRU continued training until they 
were called forward to an operational 
theatre. D Company was responsible 
for providing this ongoing program, 
which sometimes included low-
level collective, or group, training, 
such as section stalks, night patrols, 
and minefield drills. The aim was 
to exercise soldiers continually and 
keep their skills sharp.20 As time 
allowed, 1 CIRU also provided some 
men with specialist training, such as 
3-inch mortar and 6-pounder anti-
tank gun courses that lasted three and 
four weeks respectively.21
From ear ly  June  to  ear ly 
S e p t e m b e r  1 9 4 4 ,  h o w e v e r , 
reinforcements passed through the 
CIRUs too quickly to receive the 
full range of continuation training. 
During this period, the army was 
under enormous pressure to sustain 
a steady stream of reinforcements 
to its infantry units, minimizing 
the time soldiers could remain 
Canadian soldiers train in England.
Left: Crossing a rope line high over a 
group of watching officers, June 1943.
Below: Two soldiers climb over a log wall 
obstacle, November 1941.
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in Britain. Early that summer, on 
orders from Headquarters Canadian 
Reinforcement Units (CRU), all 
CIRUs reduced the two-week 
refresher course to one week.22 
The week-long syllabus included 
mostly weapons training and range 
practices. Furthermore, owing to 
a lack of time, 1 CIRU conducted 
TOETs for only two of eight drafts 
sent forward during this period, 
making it difficult for the unit to 
attest to the combat readiness of 
each reinforcement. During this 
“rush” period, 1 CIRU’s commander, 
Colonel C.B. Ware, assessed that most 
of these men required additional 
refresher training. Still, 1 CIRU did 
what it could to make the best use of 
the available time. For example, the 
unit held classes during the weekends 
and evenings, and it provided 
additional training on mines and 
booby traps to soldiers who required 
it. Although the soldiers’ training was 
not complete, according to Colonel 
Ware “no man was despatched who 
had not received instruction in all 
platoon weapons and had fired each 
weapon.”23
By mid-September, the situation 
stabilized, and CIRUs received 
orders to reinstitute the two-week 
syllabus.24 This allowed 1 CIRU to 
revert to its previous practice of 
delivering the mandatory two-week 
course, re-training soldiers whose 
performance during the two weeks 
was insufficient, and providing 
ongoing training to soldiers who 
passed the standard course while 
they awaited call-up.25 
There is evidence that 1 CIRU 
periodically took measures to 
improve training. For example, 
on at least one occasion the unit 
managed to take into its ranks as 
permanent staff a group of officers 
and non-commissioned officers 
(NCOs) with recent experience 
in Italy.26 Furthermore, the unit 
carefully assessed the level of training 
soldiers received in Canada prior 
to arriving at 1 CIRU, with the 
training companies actively seeking 
to identify and rectify major training 
deficiencies.27 By October 1944 1 CIRU 
refined the process by making the 
companies responsible for providing 
the unit chief instructor with detailed 
assessments on inadequately trained 
individuals. Each of these assessments, 
consolidated by the chief instructor in 
“State of Training – Reinforcements” 
reports, included an affected soldier’s 
name, course number and dates of his 
training in Canada, and statements 
of deficiency.28 On 1 September, 
a group of senior officers from 
HQ CRU and a liaison officer from 
Canada conducted a visit to 1 CIRU, 
during which the unit chief instructor 
provided “general criticisms and 
suggestions” regarding the training 
of soldiers in Canada.29
In short, infantry soldiers passing 
through Britain on their way to 
Italy received carefully planned 
continuation training at one of the 
army’s reinforcement units. Generally 
speaking, the longer a soldier stayed 
in Britain, the more training he 
received. Even during the “rush 
period” of June-September 1944, 
soldiers received at least a week’s 
training to refresh their ability to use 
standard platoon weapons. Outside 
the rush period, soldiers received 
more training – of at least two weeks 
to cover the essentials – and often a 
great deal more for those who spent 
months at a reinforcement unit. 
After departing a CIRU in 
Britain for Italy, all soldiers passed 
through the Mediterranean theatre’s 
reinforcement depot, 1 CBRD, where 
they received yet more training before 
finally joining their units.30 Although 
the army originally intended that 
1 CBRD only hold reinforcements 
waiting to be called to their units, 
by 1944, the depot provided new 
arrivals with refresher training to 
make up for any deficiencies.31 On 22 
January, the commandant of 1 CBRD, 
Colonel G. Hedley Bashar, issued 
an order that held the depot’s three 
battalion commanders responsible 
for ensuring that, “the physical 
conditions of personnel and their 
level of training is such that they 
will be suitable reinforcements.” 
The battalion commanders were 
to sign attestations indicating that 
each soldier deploying forward was 
medically and administratively fit and 
that their equipment was “complete 
and in satisfactory condition.”32 
In February, the commander of 1 
Canadian Base Reinforcement Group 
(1 CBRD’s superior headquarters), 
Brigadier E.W. Haldenby, issued a 
training instruction that reinforced 
the fundamental importance of 
preparing men for combat, stating 
“our main consideration is testing 
and completing the basic training of 
rank and file.”33 
When new drafts arrived at 
1 CBRD from Britain, the unit assessed 
each soldier to identify any training 
deficiencies. Standardized written 
assessments of incoming drafts after 
January 1944 included the following 
headings: numbers arriving, state of 
training, condition of clothing and 
equipment, documents, physical 
standard, source from which draft 
was drawn, and general comments 
on military efficiency.34 Completed 
reports attached to 1 CBRD’s war 
diary indicate that while newly 
arrived drafts during the first ten 
months of 1944 generally needed 
some improvement, there were not 
the sort of serious shortcomings and 
gaps that would merit the description 
“untrained.” For example, on 7 
March 1 CBRD assessed a new draft 
of 320 soldiers who were destined for 
service with the 48th Highlanders. 
The physical condition of these 
troops appeared “to be quite good” 
and their knowledge of fieldcraft 
and camouflage was “fair.” Most, 
however, had no experience with 
the PIAT or the Thompson sub-
machine gun (TMSG).35 (It is worth 
noting that soldiers arriving in Italy 
probably lacked training on the 
Thompson because the army had 
long since replaced it with the Sten 
5
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gun in all theatres except Italy, where 
it remained in service.) The troops 
“had some” mine warfare training, 
but were not sufficiently trained in 
field engineering and small-arms 
range work. Nonetheless, after being 
given TOETs on eight basic subjects, 
49 passed all tests, 248 failed one or 
two tests – not surprising, given most 
men required Thompson and PIAT 
training – and only 23 failed more 
than two tests.36 
Other reports on reinforcements 
arriving in Italy paint a similar 
picture of some good skills overall, 
but a need for additional continuation 
training to prepare them for frontline 
service. A consolidated assessment 
of March 1944 on 11 newly arrived 
drafts (who came from six different 
CIRUs) reported that:
approximately 50% of the ORs are 
well grounded in basic subjects 
other than TMSG, PIAT & 2” mortar 
in which training was not complete 
though all had some knowledge of 
these weapons. They were taught 
Sten in UK instead of TMSG. 
Remainder require more handling 
in most basic and advanced subjects.
The group was “in need of a 
few more weeks training.”37 In early 
April, an assessment of newly-arrived 
troops indicated that while discipline 
and morale were good, their training 
was “not entirely satisfactory” due 
to insufficient time spent in Britain.38 
Similarly, a late May assessment 
noted that the soldiers in a recently 
arrived draft were generally well-
trained (that is, most troops passed 
most of the TOETs) but required 
additional training on some weapons 
such as the Thompson and PIAT.39 
All these new arrivals were to receive 
training at 1 CBRD to rectify these 
deficiencies and prepare each man 
for service in the line.
At 1 CBRD there was refresher 
training for individual skills, as well 
as physical conditioning and some 
collective training. Each week from 
Monday to Saturday training took 
place from 0800 hours to at least 
1630 hours and included, among 
An MFM 4 Service and Casualty Form for a soldier who joined the 48th Highlanders as a reinforcement in June 1944. This soldier 
arrived in England with the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and spent nine months at various Canadian Infantry Reinforcement 
Units before being sent to Italy.
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other subjects, weapons lectures 
and practice on ranges, physical 
fitness, mine warfare lectures, ten-
mile route marches, and individual 
and section fieldcraft training. Night 
training included marches and 
patrol practices.40 In April, 1 CBRD 
increased the pace of training so 
that within three weeks all available 
reinforcements would be fully 
trained and ready to join their units. 
Brigadier Haldenby also ordered 
all 1 CBRD battalion commanders 
to hold an eight-day field exercise 
without delay. He directed that units 
maintain “a high standard of patrol 
and fieldcraft training” and that 
they make every soldier capable of 
marching ten miles within two hours 
for “hardening” purposes. Night 
training was to occur at least two 
nights per week.41 
Training regimes tailored to 
the requirements of specific groups 
were also provided by 1 CBRD. In 
February 1944, for example, a group 
of reinforcements for the Royal 
22nd Regiment proved to have 
an “excellent” level of weapons 
training, but needed more practice 
in fieldcraft, battle drill and night 
operations. A custom two-week 
program saw the troops improve 
rapidly.42 Officers also received 
special attention. In mid-February 
1944, 1 CBRD implemented a plan 
to optimize officer readiness to 
lead men in battle. The unit kept 
reinforcement officers fully involved 
in the troops’ training regimes. 
These officers were responsible for 
teaching basic subjects, planning and 
executing exercises, and rehearsing 
men in the conduct of reconnaissance 
and fighting patrols. In addition, 
once a week, officers attended cloth-
model exercises at night, participated 
in radio handling exercises, and 
wrote papers on general military 
subjects.43 Other programs at 1 CBRD 
included one and two-week specialist 
courses that qualified individuals 
as mortarmen, machine gunners, 
signallers, and stretcher bearers. 
Some soldiers also received 
advanced instruction on 
mines.44
To ensure training 
was relevant,  1  CBRD 
p e r i o d i c a l l y  s o u g h t 
feedback from line units 
on reinforcement quality. 
In late February 1944, a 
1 CBRD delegation visited 
various line units where, 
interestingly, there was 
l i t t le  serious crit icism 
regarding basic skills. The 
commanding officer of the 
Royal Canadian Regiment 
(RCR) advised that some 
t r o o p s  n e e d e d  m o r e 
training in night fighting, 
night patrols, and “taking 
over positions.” Brigadier 
Dan Spry, commander 
of 1st Canadian Infantry 
Brigade, opined that units 
needed more men with 
specialist qualifications, 
such as snipers, mine and booby-trap 
handlers, and demolition experts, 
though he also noted that “some 
personnel have arrived unfamiliar 
with the use of grenades and tommy 
guns.” Brigadier T. Eric Snow, 
commander of 11th Canadian Infantry 
Brigade, advised that some personnel 
in a recent draft had not passed all 
TOETs.45 During another visit to 
units in late March, front line officers 
were more critical of reinforcement 
training, advising 1 CBRD that new 
soldiers lacked expertise on the PIAT, 
the Thompson SMG, mortars, and the 
Vickers machine gun. (While not to 
be dismissive of these complaints, the 
Vickers and two of three mortar types 
in service – the 3-inch and the 4.2-inch 
– required specialist training). Too 
many reinforcement soldiers also had 
poor weapons maintenance habits.46 
These commentaries underscore 
two points: that 1 CBRD actively 
sought feedback from units on how 
to improve training, and, while 
units reported some problems, the 
deficiencies were not grave. 
The army also sought to ensure 
training at 1 CBRD met front-line 
needs by posting veterans into the 
depot as instructors. In January 
1944 the 48th Highlanders alone 
sent seven NCOs to 1 CBRD on 
an exchange program.47 Later, 
in June 1944, the army planned 
to exchange officers and NCOs 
between operational field units and 
1 CBRD’s permanent staff. The aim 
was to furnish reinforcements with 
relevant, high-quality training, while 
providing less stressful employment 
to soldiers who had served in the 
line for prolonged periods. At the 
same time, the scheme would allow 
instructors from the reinforcement 
depots to gain valuable combat 
experience.48 On 21 September, the 
Royal 22nd Regiment’s Major Paul 
Triquet, a national hero who was 
awarded the Victoria Cross the 
previous December for his heroism 
and leadership in battle, joined 
1 CBRD as the 1st Battalion’s second-
in-command.49 On 7 October, the 
48th Highlanders sent another two 
Major Paul Triquet joined 1 Canadian Base Reinforcement 
Depot as the second-in-command of 1st Battalion. As a 
recent Victoria Cross recipient his battle experience would 
have been useful in preparing new troops for combat.
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NCOs to 1 CBRD to assist in the 
training of personnel remustered to 
infantry.50 Other operational units 
almost certainly did likewise.
For a brief period, 1 CBRD 
even sent formed groups forward 
to operational units to receive 
training. In mid-June 1944, Major-
General Chris Vokes, commander 
of 1st Canadian Infantry Division, 
authorized 1 CBRD to attach to each 
of the division’s infantry battalions a 
100-man company of reinforcements 
for two weeks of training.51 On 18 
June, the companies left 1 CBRD 
to join the field units of all three 
brigades.52 That evening, the 48th 
Highlanders greeted their company 
and prepared to execute the training 
scheme. At this time, the unit (indeed, 
the entire Canadian Corps) was in 
reserve, and therefore presumably 
had the capacity to train its future 
reinforcements. Some of the officers 
in this company of trainees – which 
the 48th Highlanders embraced by 
naming E Company – remained 
with the unit until mid-July before 
returning to 1 CBRD.53
During September and October 
1944, however, 1 CBRD was hard-
pressed to furnish units with enough 
reinforcements, and this may have 
affected the quality of training. 
Indeed, by September 1944, high 
casualty rates and the attendant 
demand for new troops had all but 
depleted the infantry reinforcement 
pool in Italy.  Throughout the 
month, 1 CBRD barely kept up 
with demands.54 On 4 September, 
1 CBRD received authority to deploy 
tradesmen and non-trade specialists, 
such as cooks and drivers, for 
General Duty (ie. infantry) service, 
if required for emergencies.55 The 
war diary contains no indication 
that the depot ultimately took such 
desperate measures, nor does it 
indicate whether or not the unit sent 
drafts forward before training was 
completed. 1 CBRD fully expected, 
however, that specialist courses 
would be cancelled in order to free 
men for immediate combat service.56 
Furthermore, on 18 September, 
1 CBRD’s commander, Colonel 
J.H. Christie, advised his battalion 
commanders that “the situation in 
the forward area is such that it is 
vitally important to send forward 
every available officer and man.” He 
ordered 1 CBRD to recall all men on 
leave, review all cases of personnel 
declared “unavailable,” complete 
all outstanding dental work, and 
resolve all disciplinary cases without 
delay.57 The pressure to produce as 
many infantry reinforcements as 
possible continued until at least the 
end of October, when the Canadian 
Corps was finally taken out of the 
line and the pressing requirement 
for reinforcements eased.58 If ever 
there was a period when 1 CBRD was 
hard-pressed to provide adequate 
training due to a lack of time, it was 
in September and October 1944. 
There is one group of men who 
do not appear to have received 
adequate training at 1 CBRD during 
this period – men transferred to 
infantry from other corps. In late 
August 1944, the army implemented 
a concerted remustering program 
to help meet the growing need for 
infantry reinforcements.59 While 
most basic infantry training for 
remustered soldiers occurred in 
Britain, 1 CBRD trained those soldiers 
who transferred to the infantry corps 
while already serving in Italy.60 
Furthermore, in early October the 
army sent a group of 496 members of 
the Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps 
(RCOC) and the Royal Canadian 
Electrical and Mechanical Engineers 
(RCEME) from Britain to Italy for 
conversion training.61 The training 
provided to this group was not 
extensive. Unfortunately, 1 CBRD 
learned only at the last minute that 
it was responsible for training these 
troops; on 6 October, just two days 
before the soldiers arrived, 1 CBRD’s 
chief instructor alerted the unit that 
the training of these men “appears to 
be the responsibility of 1 C.B.R.D.” 
He issued a rudimentary training 
plan, consisting of only three weeks’ 
instruction on elementary skills and 
procedures.62 Even this program 
was difficult to implement owing 
to a shortage of instructors.63 Thus, 
soldiers remustered to infantry and 
trained in Italy in October may have 
been inadequately trained.
It is not clear from the 48th 
Highlanders’ war diary to what 
extent, if any, the remustered soldiers 
were a burden on the unit. The 
entry for 11 September laments the 
arrival of a draft of four officers, 
none with combat experience, and 
Infantrymen of the 48th Highlanders of 
Canada advancing on Point 146 during 
the advance on the Gothic Line near the 
Foglia River, Italy, 28-29 August 1944.
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90 men, most of whom – aside from 
those returning from convalescence 
– were remustered to infantry. 
Nevertheless, a surprising number 
of reinforcements arriving at the 48th 
Highlanders between the middle 
of August and the end of October 
had previous service in the unit. 
The regiment’s war diary notes that 
most of the men in a reinforcement 
draft of one officer and 48 men who 
arrived on 13 August “had been 
with the Battalion before.”64 On 9 
September the regiment received a 
draft of one officer and 53 men. The 
officer was one of the E Company 
trainees attached to the battalion 
during the early summer, while 
about half of the men “had served 
with the battalion before but had 
been evacuated through wounds 
or sickness.”65 On 28 September, 
the unit welcomed back ten of its 
soldiers who had been hospitalized 
then temporarily posted to other 
units.66 On 5 October, one major and 
24 non-commissioned reinforcements 
arrived, “all of them Highlanders 
of long standing.”67 Finally, on 27 
October, 43 reinforcements arrived, 
“all but six of whom were previously 
with the Battalion.” Two were new 
officers who had served previously 
in the unit as NCOs.68 It is therefore 
possible that the high number of 
experienced reinforcements balanced 
the challenges of absorbing poorly-
trained remusters.
Certainly the 48th Highlanders’ 
war diary for the period January to 
October 1944 says very little about 
the overall quality of reinforcements, 
and the few instances in which 
reinforcement training is mentioned 
do not highlight poor readiness. The 
war diary for March 1944 contains 
instructions from 1st Canadian 
Infantry Brigade that detail the 
brigade commander’s expectations 
for processing newly arriving 
reinforcements. Units were to hold 
new troops in rear areas for up to 
four days, but not less than 24 hours, 
during which staffs were to review 
each soldier’s documents, verify his 
personal equipment as complete, and 
issue his unit badges and flashes. 
Units were to give each soldier 
“smartening up drill,” consisting of 
“general tactical hints” and weapons 
handling tests. Finally, units were 
to place particular emphasis on 
educating the new soldiers on 
“unit history and customs.”69 Such 
instructions hardly seem to reflect 
significant concern at the brigade 
level for the reinforcements’ state of 
training. Similarly, a war diary entry 
for 10 September notes that the RSM 
was busy “making life supremely 
miserable” for a draft of newly 
arrived reinforcements, indicating 
that “from morning to night under 
RSM CROSSLEY’s critical eye they 
march, salute and do arms drill and 
tests of elementary training in small 
arms.”70 While such treatment of 
new arrivals was no doubt necessary 
to establish the unit’s standard of 
discipline, the emphasis on marching 
and saluting is not what one would 
expect if the unit was concerned with 
preparing undertrained troops for 
combat. 
The training at the CIRUs and at 
1 CBRD may not have been perfect, 
particularly for those men rushed 
through those units. But, as we have 
seen, many of the 48th Highlanders’ 
reinforcements spent a considerable 
amount of time at either or both 
locations. Still, to arrive at informed 
generalizations about the level of 
training for soldiers reinforcing the 
48th Highlanders, a few benchmarks 
need to be established before 
interpreting the data contained 
in the personnel files. 
For the purposes of this 
study, a soldier will be 
considered trained to 
the minimal acceptable 
standard if he completed 
– at the very least – the 
mandatory two-week 
course  provided by 
the CIRUs.  Because, 
as shown by 1 CBRD 
assessment of incoming drafts, 
soldiers still generally needed a bit 
more training after the two-week 
course, a minimum standard will be 
taken as including at least two more 
weeks training at 1 CBRD. Additional 
time at each location needs to be 
allowed for arrival and departure 
procedures, say one week before 
and after training at each location. 
This gives a total of eight weeks for 
a soldier to pass through a CIRU and 
1 CBRD and be considered trained 
to minimally acceptable standards. 
Taking this benchmark, the following 
categories have been established:
a. Soldiers with less than eight 
weeks total in the UK and at 
1 CBRD are assessed as probably 
not well-trained;
b. Soldiers who spent eight to 12 
weeks total in the UK and at 
1 CBRD were probably trained 
to the minimal  acceptable 
standard. Still, in order to err on 
the side of caution, these soldiers 
are assessed here as having a 
questionable level of training;
c. Soldiers who spent between 12 
and 20 weeks in the UK and at 
1 CBRD – that is, having received 
between three and five months of 
refresher training – are assessed 
as probably well-trained; and
d. Soldiers who spent over 20 
weeks, or five months, in the UK 
and at 1 CBRD are assumed to be 
well-trained.
Figure 2 captures the results of 89 
reinforcements assessed according 
to these criteria. 
Figure 2: Training State of Reinforcements
Well-trained
Over 20 weeks in UK or at CBRD 39 (44%)
Probably well-trained
12-20 weeks in UK or at CBRD 24 (27%)
Questionable
8-12 weeks in UK or at CBRD 15 (17%)
Probably not well-trained
Less than 8 weeks in UK or at CBRD 11 (12%)
Total 89 (100%)
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This analysis is subjective. 
Amongst other factors, certain 
personnel may have experienced 
extenuating circumstances that 
resulted in reduced time for training. 
A soldier posted to a CIRU or 1 CBRD 
may have spent part of his time 
there in detention, or in hospital, or 
a combination of both, though such 
circumstances have been accounted 
for where possible. Similarly, because 
the personnel files rarely indicate 
how each soldier spent his time at 
each unit, some men were likely 
occupied with duties other than 
training for possibly considerable 
lengths of time. Therefore, it is not 
claimed here that the results in Figure 
2 represent precisely how well trained 
reinforcements were when they 
arrived at the 48th Highlanders. The 
results are strong enough, however, 
to suggest a trend. That is, most 
reinforcements (roughly 70 percent) 
were well-trained, based on the fact 
that they spent a minimum of three 
months training in the reinforcement 
system. With somewhat greater 
confidence, one can conclude that a 
relatively small proportion of soldiers 
(slightly over 10 percent) were 
probably not well-trained when taken 
on strength by the 48th Highlanders, 
because they passed through the 
reinforcement system too quickly. 
Another group, numbering just 
under 20 percent, had a questionable 
level of training. Interestingly, these 
numbers correspond closely with the 
opinions expressed by the infantry 
officers reported in Robert Engen’s 
study. 
Finally, it is worth noting that 
information in the personnel files 
reviewed for this study reinforce 
an important, but perhaps under-
appreciated, and objectionable, aspect 
of the army’s manpower management 
during the Second World War: the 
fact that the army heavily pressured 
conscripts raised under the National 
Resources Mobilization Act (NRMA) 
to volunteer for service overseas. 
As Daniel Byers explains in his 
article “Mobilising Canada: The 
National Resources Mobilization 
Act, the Department of National 
Defence, and Compulsory Military 
Service in Canada, 1940-1945,” while 
the government obliged NRMA 
conscripts, or “Zombies,” to serve 
only in defence of the homeland, the 
army soon realized that pressuring 
conscripts to “go active” was an 
effective way to increase the number 
of men for overseas service. Army 
training centres deliberately mixed 
conscripts and volunteers in the same 
training platoons, encouraged the 
volunteers to pressure the conscripts, 
and implemented a wide array of 
other measures designed to pressure 
the NRMA men to volunteer for 
active service. The efforts were often 
brutal and coercive, and sometimes 
included the threatened or actual use 
of violence. They were also effective, 
with some training units achieving 
100 percent volunteer rates.71 Fully 
a quarter of the reinforcements to 
the 48th Highlanders in the sample 
considered for this paper (22 of 89) 
Private Stanley Rodgers of the 48th 
Highlanders of Canada, who holds a 
PIAT anti-tank weapon, resting north of 
the Conca River en route to Rimini, Italy, 
September 1944.
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were either conscripted under the 
NRMA then went active, or chose to 
volunteer for General Service when 
it was clear that they were about to 
be conscripted (for example, after 
having received call-up notices). 
Farley Mowat’s quote at the 
beginning of this paper refers to 
a draft that arrived at his unit, 
the Hastings and Prince Edward 
Regiment, on 24 December 1943. 
The other two infantry regiments in 
the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade, 
the 48th Highlanders and the Royal 
Canadian Regiment, also received 
drafts the same day.72 In fact, 14 
of the 89 reinforcements reviewed 
for this paper were part of the 24 
December draft reinforcing the 48th 
Highlanders. But whereas Mowat 
learned that the soldiers arriving at 
his unit had apparently “arrived in 
England from Canada only a month 
earlier,” the soldiers arriving at the 
48th - at least the 14 whose records 
were examined here - spent on 
average over 15 months in England. 
And, to a man, they also spent about 
six weeks at 1 CBRD before joining 
the 48th Highlanders in the line. The 
same is probably true for the troops 
Mowat greeted.73 
By and large the reinforcements 
arriving at the 48th Highlanders 
during the first ten months of 1944 
spent enough time training in Britain 
and Italy to be reasonably well-
prepared for combat. This contradicts 
the mass of anecdotal information 
which maintains that the army rushed 
reinforcements into battle before they 
were ready. Nonetheless, additional 
research regarding reinforcement 
training is required to confirm or 
refine the results presented here. 
The examination of a larger sample 
of data, such as for all three infantry 
units in the 1st Canadian Infantry 
Brigade, would be valuable. Further 
scrutiny of the training provided to 
remustered soldiers would be equally 
important. Nonetheless, it is difficult 
to accept that soldiers who generally 
spent a fair amount of time training 
in the reinforcement system arrived 
at their units utterly incapable of 
basic tasks.
E x p l a i n i n g  t h e  a n e c d o t a l 
evidence of the reinforcements’ 
allegedly poor readiness is difficult. 
Some complaints were probably well-
founded. Ten percent of the soldiers 
examined here did not spend enough 
time in the reinforcement system to 
receive adequate refresher training. 
Some observers of these personnel 
may have painted all reinforcements 
with the same brush. For brief periods 
of time, the CIRUs and 1 CBRD (from 
early June to early September 1944, 
and September to October 1944 
respectively) were challenged to 
keep the stream of reinforcements 
f lowing, and soldiers passing 
through those units during those 
periods likely received abbreviated 
training regimes. Furthermore, there 
may be some truth to the notion, 
as suggested by the army’s official 
historian, C.P. Stacey, that “no 
commanding officer ever admits that 
the reinforcements his unit receives 
have been properly trained.”74 By 
1944 the Canadian infantry battalions 
in Italy were hardened and veteran 
units, fighting a determined and 
resourceful enemy in difficult terrain 
and weather conditions that favoured 
the defenders. Units such as the 
48th Highlanders had through grim 
experience developed techniques 
tailored to these difficult conditions. It 
would be surprising if reinforcements 
did not lack the specialized skills 
resident in these veteran outfits. 
In addition, other critics may have 
complained of poor reinforcement 
quality in an effort to convince the 
government to send NRMA soldiers 
overseas to support the fighting units. 
Conn Smythe, for one, concluded his 
famous public criticism of the quality 
of reinforcements by calling for 
taxpayers to insist that the government 
support the fighting units by ordering 
the NRMA men overseas.75 Perhaps 
others were tempted to decry poor 
reinforcement training to mask 
other problems that resulted in poor 
A Canadian soldier fires a PIAT anti-tank 
weapon at a training school west of 
Ortona, Italy, 10 January 1944.
Li
br
ar
y 
an
d 
Ar
ch
iv
es
 C
an
ad
a 
PA
 2
05
26
4
11
: New Men in the Line An Assessment of Reinforcements to the 48th Highlanders in Italy, January-October 1944
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015
46
battlefield performance, such as weak 
leadership at low levels. Finally, C.P. 
Stacey relates that some infantry 
officers suggested that soldiers may 
“have deliberately understated their 
training in the hope of getting safer 
assignments,” though he offers no 
further detail.76
The mass of anecdotal information 
claiming that infantry reinforcements 
during the Second World War were 
poorly-trained is at odds with army 
personnel records and reinforcement 
unit  f i les .  Similarly,  the 48th 
Highlanders’ war diary for the first 
ten difficult months of 1944 contains 
no disparaging comments regarding 
the quality of its reinforcements. 
Few of the men reinforcing the 48th 
Highlanders during those months 
were rushed into battle. Most, 
though not all, spent too long in 
the reinforcement stream’s training 
units to be considered untrained. A 
proportion – the actual size is difficult 
to assess, but a bold estimate would 
be as high as 30 percent – probably 
needed more refresher training, but 
these troops were the exception, not 
the rule. More research is required 
to clarify the factors that led to 
the perceptions and accusations of 
poorly-trained reinforcements. The 
military records reviewed for this 
paper certainly confirm the army’s 
difficulty in generating enough 
infantry reinforcements during 
the summer and early fall of 1944. 
Some soldiers probably required 
additional refresher training, but in 
all likelihood the problem was not 
nearly as pronounced or widespread 
as the mass of anecdotal evidence 
suggests.
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